Official: Prime Minister: Prime Minister's Personal Telegrams.

Reference code: CHAR 20/75

Part of: CHAR 20
Next record: CHAR 20/76
Previous record: CHAR 20/74

Date: 08 May 1942 - 01 Jun 1942

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Open

Physical: 1 bound file (129 folios)
Publication: Alternative format:
Original Reference: Original references: T 701/2 to T 800/2 Language:

Contained records

Reference Record Date
CHAR 20/75/1 Old file cover. [Annotated with filing notes]. May 1942
CHAR 20/75/2 Telegram from the Middle East Defence Committee to WSC: "There has been no interruption of preparations, which are proceeding as planned.". 08 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/3 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, conveying the view of the Chiefs of Staff, Defence Committee and War Cabinet that Auchinleck should attack the enemy and fight a major battle during May. Annotated by Francis Brown, Private Secretary to WSC, with note about further circulation. 08 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/4 Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] accepting his offer of one complete South African Brigade Group for Madagascar. 08 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/5 Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] regarding Operation "Ironclad" [codename for operation against Diego Suarez, Madagascar]: "There were considerable risks which up to the present seem to have been successfully overridden.". 09 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/6 Telegram from WSC to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret and Major-General Robert Sturges [Commanders of taskforce for operation against Madagascar, "Ironclad"] congratulating them on the operation with an added remark for 29th Brigade only. 09 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/7 Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin regarding convoys to the Soviet Union: outlines difficulties of sailing convoys to the Soviet Union; lists measures required from the Soviet Union to help protect convoys; states that he will be making the broadcast warning of British retaliation to German gas attacks upon Soviet Armies tomorrow. 09 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/8-10 Telegram from the Middle East Defence Committee to WSC (Minister of Defence) and Chiefs of Staff marked "most secret" listing reasons for their opposition to an early offensive in Libya: comments on the importance of Malta and states that its fall would not necessarily be fatal to the security of Egypt; comments on the difficulties of establishing a firm position in Cyrenaica [Libya] and of the dangers of launching an offensive with inadequate armoured forces; comments on the possible advantages of waiting for an enemy offensive in early June. 09 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/11-12 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, marked "most secret" stating the position of the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee and the War Cabinet that "Malta shall not be allowed to fall without a battle being fought by your whole army for its retention"; comments on the implications if Malta should fall and states that the very latest date for engaging the enemy is one which provides a distraction for the June convoy. 10 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/13 Telegram from WSC to the Captain and ship's company of USS Wasp [United States aircraft carrier] thanking them for their help in transporting Spitfires to Malta: "Who said a wasp couldn't sting twice?". 11 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/14 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, India, marked "most secret" stating that he will be glad to have General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding Burma] back from Burma as soon as operations permit. 11 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/15 Telegram from the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] to WSC congratulating him on his speech [broadcast from London, 10 May 1942]. 11 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/16 Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Peter Fraser] thanking him for his telegram [see CHAR 20/75/15]. 11 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/17-19 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] marked "personal and secret" requesting supplies of aircraft: asks for help in securing a loan of 200 Martlets (fighter aircraft) to help meet the threat posed by Japanese aircraft carriers equipped with fighter dive-bombers; asks for an early supply of transport aircraft for use by British airborne forces during the summer; suggests that American airborne units should be sent to train alongside their British counterparts in Britain. 12 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/20 Telegram marked Personal from Lord Halifax [British Ambassador to the United States, earlier Edward Wood, then Lord Irwin] to WSC regarding the favourable reaction in the United States to the Prime Minister's recent speech [? broadcast of 10 May 1942]. [With annotation that a letter was sent to the Foreign Office to telegraph Lord Halifax thanking him and asking him to thank Sumner Welles [United States Under-Secretary of State]. 11 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/21 Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief, Middle East] to WSC commenting on the last paragraph of telegram from WSC on 10 May 1942 [see CHAR 20/75/11-12, which designates Auchinleck as Military Commander-in-Chief] and stating that he does not propose to act on it as "I do not wish to run any risk of disturbing present good relations between three services". 12 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/22 Telegram from WSC to the Duke of Windsor [earlier Edward, Prince of Wales and King Edward VIII, Governor of the Bahamas] marked "personal and secret" thanking him for his letter which "I am carefully considering.". 12 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/23 Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC commenting on the last paragraph of WSC 's telegram of 10 May 1942 [see CHAR 20/75/11-12] designating General Sir Claude Auchinleck as Military Commander-in-Chief and stating that relations between Auchinleck [Army Commander-in-Chief Middle East] and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding- in-Chief Mediterranean]"are of the very best" and that "it would not be in the best interests to make Tedder subordinate to Auchinleck even temporarily.". 12 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/24-25 Telegram from WSC to the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] commenting on the relationship between General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in- Chief Middle East] and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Mediterranean] and on the role of the Middle East Defence Committee and stating that relations between Auchinleck and Tedder are set out in his directive of 7 October 1941 and reciting the relevant paragraph. 13 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/26 Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief India] to WSC stating that General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding, Burma] should be at Imphal [India] "to-day or very shortly" and expressing regret at Alexander's removal. 13 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/27 Telegram from WSC and the Chiefs of Staff to the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] advising him that all Heavy Bomber Units from the United States shall be concentrated in Britain and that his suggestion would be regarded as a departure from agreed plans for the offensive in Western Europe. 13 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/28 Telegram from Joseph Stalin to WSC thanking him for his promise to arrange for the maximum delivery of war materials to the Soviet Union and stating that "all possible measures" will be taken by the Air Force and Navy of Soviet Union to protect transports. 13 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/29 Telegram from WSC to [Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States, earlier Edward Wood then Lord Irwin]: "Thank you so much and please also thank Welles [Sumner Welles, United States Under-Secretary of State] for what he said" [? on WSC's broadcast, 10 May 1942]. 13 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/30 Telegram from Lord Halifax [British Ambassador to the United States, earlier Edward Wood, then Lord Irwin] to WSC requesting that arrangements be made to leave Field Marshal Sir John Dill [Head of British Joint Staff Mission to Washington, United States] in the United States and not to transfer him to Bombay [India]. 13 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/31 Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Sir John Dill [Head of British Joint Staff Mission to Washington, United States] confirming that Dill should remain in Washington and stating that Sir [Lawrence] Roger Lumley [later 11th Lord Scarbrough] will remain as Governor of Bombay [India] until March 1943. 14 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/32 Telegram from WSC to Lord Halifax [British Ambassador to the United States, earlier Edward Wood, then Lord Irwin] reciting the text of a telegram he has sent to Field Marshal Sir John Dill [Head of British Joint Staff Mission to Washington, United States] informing Dill that arrangements have been made for him to remain in Washington. 15 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/33 Telegram from WSC to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] marked "most secret" commenting on the Madagascar operation [codenamed "Ironclad"]: states that the 13th and 17th Brigades must go on to India almost immediately; comments on the change in situation in the Indian Ocean, the build-up of the British fleet and the unlikelihood of an attempt by the Japanese to occupy Madagascar; states that Syfret must decide whether to take Tamatave and Majunga in the next few days or whether to make himself comfortable in Diego Suarez; comments on the possibility of establishing a "modus vivendi" with the French authorities and states that the local situation will not be ruined by orders from home for the sake of the Free French. 15 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/34-35 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief India, marked "most secret" outlining objectives for the war in the Far East: comments on the transfer of troops from Madagascar; comments on plans to assemble the whole Eastern Fleet at Colombo [Ceylon, later Sri Lanka] and Port Trincomalee [Ceylon, later Sri Lanka] before the middle of July and to recover effective control of the Bay of Bengal [Indian Ocean]; suggests that these dispositions will facilitate offensive action in Burma and particularly an attack on Rangoon to help Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek [Chinese Nationalist leader]. 15 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/36 Telegram from Harry Hopkins [Special Adviser and Assistant to the President of the United States] to WSC congratulating him on his speech of last Sunday [10 May 1942] and promising to reply to his private message in a day or two. 15 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/37 Telegram from WSC to 6th Lord Gort, Governor and Commander-in-Chief Malta [earlier John Vereker] marked "personal and secret" appointing him as Supreme Commander of the Fighting Services and Civil Administration in Malta until further notice. 15 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/38 Telegram from Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] marked "most secret" discussing the feasibility of further operations in Madagascar to capture Tamatave and Majunga. 15 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/39-40 Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC reporting on his first ten days in Egypt and the impressions he has gained: includes comments on the harmonious working of the army and air force; the administrative work of Lieutenant-General Thomas Riddell- Webster [Lieutenant General in charge of Administration Middle East]; organisation of supplies in the Middle East; the situation in Syria and Egypt; relations with United States forces; the use of Spitfires over Malta; organisations dealing with unconventional methods of warfare (Special Operations Executive/Special Intelligence Service); the possibility of a road and air route for personnel and stores from West Africa to Cairo; the effect of the decision by Sir Walter Monckton [Director General of British Propaganda and Information Services, Cairo] to return to Britain. 15 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/41 Telegram from Field Marshal Sir John Dill [Head of British Joint Staff Mission to Washington, United States] marked "secret" thanking WSC for informing him of the decision to keep him in Washington. 16 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/42-43 Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief India] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the situation in India: comments on estimates for the arrival of reinforcements; assesses principal dangers for the next two months; comments on problems of railway movement; promises to telegraph separately on the defences of Ceylon [later Sri Lanka]; states that all operations will depend mainly on the strength of air force that can be provided. 16 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/44 Telegram from Lord Halifax [British Ambassador to the United States, earlier Edward Wood, then Lord Irwin] to WSC marked "personal and secret" expressing his delight [at the decision to keep Field Marshal Sir John Dill in Washington]. Despatched 15 May [United States time]. Received 16 May [British time]. 15 May 1942 - 16 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/45 Telegram from WSC and Chiefs of Staff to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [Commander Force "H" Sea Command] [Madagascar] marked "most secret" instructing him to abandon operations for the capture of Tamatave and Majunga, to concentrate on securing Diego Suarez, and to release troops for India. 16 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/46-47 Telegram from the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] to WSC marked "personal and secret" regarding the movement of American equipment and personnel to Britain: states that the failure of the United States to meet minimum requirements for carrier fighters in 1942 means that he cannot loan Martlets [fighter aircraft] to Britain; comments on plans to move air transport units to Britain; welcomes invitation for American parachutists to train in Britain and states that a battalion will be sent in June. 17 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/48-49 Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret" regarding the situation in Madagascar and reciting a telegram from WSC and Chiefs of Staff to Rear-Admiral [Edward] Neville Syfret [see CHAR 20/75/45]: comments on the reasons for delaying the occupation of Tamatave and Majunga; proposes a "modus vivendi" with the Vichy French; suggests that 4th Lord Harlech [earlier William Ormsby-Gore, High Commissioner for Britain in South Africa] visit Diego Suarez. 17 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/50 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] marked "most secret" asking for some account of his general intentions. 17 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/51 Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief India] to WSC marked "most secret" reporting on the latest situation in Burma and north east India: comments on the movements and "excellent health and spirits" of General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding Burma]; states that the troops from Burma have been collected in the Imphal area [India] and comments on their numbers and morale; reports that there has been no news of whereabouts of Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell [Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek and Commander of United States forces in China, India and Burma] nor of Chinese troops; asks for an authoritative account of the Coral Sea battle. 18 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/52 Telegram from the Captain, Officers and ship's company of USS Wasp to WSC thanking him for his gracious message [see CHAR 20/75/13]. 18 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/53 Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin marked "personal and most secret" informing him that a convoy of 35 ships sailed yesterday "with orders to fight their way through to you" but warning about possible severe losses from German bombers, stating that much will depend on the Soviet ability to bomb enemy aerodromes, and suggesting that, if losses are severe, it may be necessary to hold up further convoys until the ice recedes. 19 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/54-55 Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in- Chief Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" outlining his intentions for the immediate future and commenting on factors affecting the date of an offensive, including the timing of the Malta convoy, possible enemy action, and relative strengths of enemy and allied forces, and concluding that "the success of a major offensive cannot be regarded as in any way certain" and asking that it be given no publicity. 19 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/56-58 Telegram from the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] to WSC regarding the allocation of combat aircraft manufactured in the United States: argues that planes should be removed from reserve status and that every appropriate American-made aircraft should be manned and fought by an American crew; comments on changes in conditions and suggests that the Combined Chiefs of Staff determine the strength of aircraft to be maintained in the respective theatres of war; proposes meetings between General Henry Arnold [Chief of the United States Army Air Force], Towers, Air Vice-Marshal Douglas Evill [Head of RAF delegation in Washington], Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal [Chief of the British Air Staff] and the appropriate Air Officer of the British Admiralty. 20 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/59-61 Telegram from Richard Casey [Minister of State in the Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" suggesting that the Malta convoy should sail from the Gibraltar end of the Mediterranean not the Alexandria [Egypt] end and outlining his reasons. 20 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/62-63 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] marked "most secret" regarding impending battle in North Africa: states that "We feel that the time has come for a trial of strength in Cyrenaica [Libya] and that the survival of Malta is involved"; comments on the need to prevent newspaper speculation; expresses his confidence in Auchinleck and the army but urges him to assume direct command; asks whether the New Zealand Division ought to be nearer the battle front and offers his help in dealing with the New Zealand government. 20 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/64-66 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] marked "personal and secret" regarding the President's proposals for the allocation of combat aircraft: states that the sole objective must be the optimum air impact on the enemy "irrespective of whether British or United States pilots man the aircraft"; calls for a common expansion plan; asks that General Henry Arnold [Chief of United States Army Air Force] and Towers be sent at the earliest possible moment and states that Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal [Chief of the British Air Staff] will return with them; states that if necessary he will come to the United States himself (with hand-written annotation in blue pencil that this phrase has been omitted in all copies circulated except to the King); expresses anxiety about General Arnold's proposals for a revision of the allocation of American aircraft to the RAF, which will mean the loss of 5000 aeroplanes, and asks the President not to take any final decision without considering how these will be replaced by American units. Annotated in red pencil: "This copy not to be circulated". 21 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/67 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander-in-Chief India] marked "most secret": states that Wavell can keep General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding, Burma] while he writes his report; comments on losses of the United States and Japan in Coral Sea action; states that the Admiralty believe the main Japanese fleet to be at Truk and that Japanese operations against Midway Island are certain, against Aleutian Islands are very probable, and against Hawaii are probable; expresses his increased hopefulness about the position in India. 21 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/68 Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander- in-Chief, India, to WSC marked "most secret" stating his belief in deceiving and disturbing the enemy by false information and advocating more coherent and long term deception plans worked between London, Washington [United States] and Commanders in the field using only officers with special qualifications. 21 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/69 Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of South Africa [Field Marshal Jan Smuts] marked "personal" offering his best wishes on the occasion of Smuts's birthday and expressing his approval of the new airgraph service between Britain and South Africa. 22 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/70 Telegram from General Sir Archibald Wavell [Commander- in-Chief, India] to WSC reporting on the withdrawal of troops from Burma: states that he has seen General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding, Burma], is flying to Dinjan [? India] where he hopes to meet Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell [Commander of United States forces in China, India and Burma, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek], and will then go to Imphal [India] to see troops from Burma; comments on numbers of troops and equipment evacuated from Burma by Alexander. 22 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/71-72 Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief, Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the impending battle in North Africa: states that "I am now absolutely clear as to my task and I will do my utmost to accomplish it to your satisfaction"; thanks WSC for arrangements regarding publicity and for his expression of confidence; comments on his own decision not to take command personally in Libya; comments on his own decision not to move the New Zealand Division out of Syria into Egypt. 22 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/73 Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin commenting on the visit to London by Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs] and asking that Molotov be allowed to return to the Soviet Union via London after his visit to the United States. 23 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/74 Telegram from Premier Joseph Stalin to WSC marked "personal and secret" thanking him for his message regarding the sailing of 35 ships to the Soviet Union and informing him that the Soviet naval and air forces will do their utmost for the protection of these transports. 24 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/75 Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of South Africa [Field Marshal Jan Smuts] expressing pleasure at his safe return to South Africa. 25 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/76 Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "most secret and personal" informing him that the Duke of Windsor [Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Bahamas, earlier Edward, Prince of Wales and King Edward VIII] is anxious to have a wider sphere of activity and asking for personal views on his appointment as Governor of Southern Rhodesia [later Zimbabwe]. 26 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/77 Telegram from Premier Joseph Stalin to WSC marked "personal and secret" confirming that Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs] will be able to stop in London on his return journey from the United States in order to complete negotiations with representatives of the British Government. 24 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/78 Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" thanking him for his birthday wishes and for the renewed invitation for a visit to London, which Smuts hopes will be possible in the near future now the situation in South Africa no longer causes anxiety. 26 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/79-81 Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC marked "most secret and personal" reporting his conclusions on general strategy based upon his visit to the Middle East: comments on the situation in Libya and states that he considers "conclusive operations in Libyan bulge essential for our real victory"; comments on the importance of holding a Middle East block, including Iran, Iraq, India, Ceylon [later Sri Lanka] and the Indian Ocean, from both German and Japanese attack; argues that there are not sufficient forces to maintain this position in the Middle East if the Soviet Union is defeated or withdraws north and suggests that American naval and land forces should be concentrated in the Indian Ocean not Australia; reports his conversation with Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Johnson [Personal Representative of the President of the United States in India], including Johnston's remarks about Mohandas Gandhi and the Congress Party. 26 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/82 Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, to WSC asking that Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten [Chief of Combined Operations and member of British Chiefs of Staff committee] be allowed to come for a short visit: states that he is having WSC's "Nassau friends" [the Duke of Windsor, Governor and Commander- in-Chief of the Bahamas, earlier Edward, Prince of Wales and King Edward VIII and Wallis, Duchess of Windsor, earlier Wallis Simpson] to lunch next Monday and is looking forward to seeing Oliver Lyttelton [Minister of Production, later 1st Lord Chandos]. 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/83 Telegram from WSC to Premier Joseph Stalin thanking him for meeting "our difficulties in the Treaty" [Treaty of Alliance between the Soviet Union and Britain], expressing pleasure that Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs] will be returning to London, commenting on the progress of a convoy to the Soviet Union and conveying his sincere good wishes and confidence of victory. Initialled. 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/84-85 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] marked "personal and secret": reports on the signing of a treaty [of alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union]; comments on Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs] and asks for Roosevelt's impressions; states that all has gone well with the Northern convoy but that the next two days will be serious; comments on talks with General Henry Arnold [Chief of United States Army Air Force] and Towers regarding the allocation of American combat aircraft; states that Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten [Chief of Combined Operations and member of British Chiefs of Staff committee] and Oliver Lyttelton [later 1st Lord Chandos, Minister of Production] will visit the United States together; comments on the importance of USS Washington to British plans in the Indian Ocean; comments on the need for naval escorts in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico; expresses gratitude for allocation of seventy tankers to build up British oil stocks. 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/86 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] informing him that he is sending "a collection of the books I have written". 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/87 Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander- in-Chief Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" informing him that he is issuing a communique stating that a large enemy force has been engaged to the south of Bir Hacheim [Libya] and that the press are not yet being allowed to send despatches commenting on these operations. 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/88 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] marked "most secret" stating that he should issue his communique [regarding an engagement in Libya], and telling him to act with freedom and to "Tell us what you would like us to do.". 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/89 Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the need for heavy bombers to deter the Italian fleet from interfering with the Malta convoy and asking whether United States Liberators could be sent if British bombers were not available. 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/90-91 Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "most secret" stating that the enemy have started an offensive in Cyrenaica [Libya] but commenting on other matters of consequence: states that he will telegraph about equipment deficiencies and the manpower position; comments on the decision by General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief, Middle East] to move General Headquarters officers and other ranks into a tented camp near the pyramids; comments on problems of corn supply in Egypt and Syria; comments on the need for heavy shipments of coal; states that there have been discussions on the best means of increasing industrial production and hopes to have a scheme shaped up very shortly; comments on the refugee problem; comments on the movements of Sir Walter Monckton [Director-General of British Propaganda and Information Services at Cairo] and hopes he may be induced to return to Egypt; states that he has visited the western desert front and has spent a day at Alexandria [Egypt] with the navy. 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/92 Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt to WSC stating that "The Visitor [Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs] is expected to-night but will not discuss Bolero [codename for build- up of United States forces in Britain for invasion of Europe] until Thursday", and asking for a short summary of WSC's and Molotov's discussions on Bolero. 27 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/93-94 Telegram from WSC to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] marked "personal and most secret" commenting on his recommendations regarding strategy: comments on British naval, land and air reinforcements for India; states that he believes the Japanese will strike north against Chiang-Kai-shek [Chinese Nationalist leader] and comments on the possibility of striking eastward at the Japanese through Burma; states that it will be difficult to meet a really heavy German attack by the Caucasus and Caspian but believes that there is no reason at present to assume that the Russian Front will break; comments on Britain's treaty with the Soviet Union. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/95-96 Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, to WSC marked "secret" in which Roosevelt suggests that he invite Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] and John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] to visit him separately in Washington [United States]. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/97-98 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt: informs Roosevelt that he is sending a report of his conversations with Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs] covering "Bolero" [codename for build-up of United States forces in Britain for invasion of Europe], "Sledgehammer" [codename for plan to attack coast of France in 1942] and "Super Round- up" [codename for the liberation of France in 1943, later Overlord]; comments on talks with United States officers and suggests landings in Norway; reports on the progress of the northern convoy towards the Soviet Union; comments on the beginning of battle in Libya; states that "We must never let Gymnast [codename for operations in French North West Africa, later Torch] pass from our minds.". 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/99 Telegram from WSC to Harry Hopkins [Special Adviser and Assistant to the President of the United States] regarding critical remarks about the Indian negotiations by Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Johnson [Personal Representative of the President in India] and stating that "frankly we do not think his comments have very much weight.". 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/100 Telegram from WSC to the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] marked "personal and secret" thanking him for his telegram [see CHAR 20/75/90-91] and awaiting further details. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/101 Telegram from Lord Halifax [British Ambassador to the United States, earlier Edward Wood, then Lord Irwin] to WSC marked "secret" reporting on a Pacific Council meeting at which the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] discussed inviting Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to Washington [United States]. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/102 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, with minutes of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street at 11am on Friday 22 May between representatives of the British Government and Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign] and his advisers concerning the opening of a second front in Europe by Britain and the United States. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/103 Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt to WSC marked "most secret" stating that he will not invite John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] to Washington [United States] until Herbert Evatt [Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General] has returned to Australia. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/104 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] marked "personal and secret" approving the President's proposals to invite Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] and John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] to the United States. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/105 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] approving the President's decision [not to invite John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, to the United States until Herbert Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General] has returned to Australia]. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/106 Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC regarding the situation in Madagascar and suggesting the reduction of Tamatave and Majunga using African and South African troops. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/107 Telegram from Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] to WSC outlining his reasons for opposing the appointment of the Duke of Windsor [Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Bahamas, earlier Edward, Prince of Wales and King Edward VIII,] as Governor of Southern Rhodesia [later Zimbabwe]. 29 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/108 Telegram from Premier Joseph Stalin to WSC commenting on the importance of the new Anglo-Soviet treaty and assuring WSC that everything will be done on the Soviet side to protect the northern convoys. 28 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/109 Telegram from John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] to WSC marked "most secret" commenting on the report he has received from Herbert Evatt [Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General] on the results of his mission to London: thanks WSC for his assurances of support and practical assistance, including provision of three Spitfire squadrons and an RAF squadron, and proposes to express his Government's appreciation in the Australian parliament. 29 May 1942 - 30 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/110 Telegram from John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] to WSC marked "secret" informing him that Stanley Bruce [High Commissioner for Australia in Britain] will replace Herbert Evatt [Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General] as accredited representative of the Australian Government in the British War Cabinet and on the Pacific Council in London. 30 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/111 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States [Franklin Roosevelt] informing him of the imminent departure from Britain of Herbert Evatt [Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General] for the United States and advising him that Evatt will need to get back to Australia before John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] can visit the United States. Initialled in red ink. 30 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/112 Telegram from WSC to John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia] marked "personal and secret" informing him of the success of the visit to Britain by Herbert Evatt [Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General]. Initialled. 30 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/113 Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "most secret" suggesting that General Henry Arnold [Chief of United States Army Air Force] be induced to visit Cairo [Egypt] on his way back to the United States where he would become acquainted with operational and maintenance problems in the Middle Eastern theatre and could inspect the British-American air ferry route across Africa. 29 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/114-116 Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "most secret" commenting on the difficulties of increasing the proportion of fighting manpower within the total strength of the army in the Middle East: states that the matter has already received considerable attention; comments on problems of geography, lack of industrial development and distance from sources of production which necessitate large support services; discusses the possibility of diluting British manpower by use of African manpower. 29 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/117 Telegram from WSC to the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] marked "most secret" informing him that it will not be possible for General Henry Arnold [Chief of United States Army Air Force] to visit Cairo [Egypt] as he must return to the United States. 31 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/118 Telegram from WSC to the Viceroy [and Governor-General] of India [2nd Lord Linlithgow, earlier Lord Hopetoun] marked "personal and secret" regarding Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Johnson [representative to India of the President of the United States]: states that Harry Hopkins [Special Adviser and Assistant to the President] has expressed himself in scathing terms about Johnson, and that WSC has telegraphed Hopkins once warning about Johnson, and will telegraph again today asking that Johnson be prevented from returning to India. 31 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/119 Telegram from WSC to Harry Hopkins [Special Adviser and Assistant to the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt] marked "personal and secret" regarding India: hopes there is no truth in rumours that Roosevelt plans to invite Shri Jawaharlal Nehru to the United States; states that neither he or the Viceroy [and Governor-General of India, 2nd Lord Linlithgow, earlier Lord Hopetoun] relishes the return to India of Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Johnson [Roosevelt's representative to India]; states that "We are fighting to defend this vast mass of helpless Indians from imminent invasion." Initialled in red ink. 31 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/120 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] marked "most secret" expressing pleasure at the way the battle has gone so far, referring to the "Special Intelligence" [? Enigma decrypts] which he is sending Auchinleck, and stating that he will have to make a statement at noon on Tuesday [2 June] and requires anything publishable by 8am on that day. 31 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/121 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief India] commenting on plans for a counter-stroke upon Japanese communications through Burma and stating that General Harold Alexander [General Officer Commanding, Burma] is needed in Britain. 31 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/122 Telegram from WSC to the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] marked "most secret" outlining reasons why more heavy bombers cannot be sent to support the Malta convoy in June. 31 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/123 Telegram from WSC to General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] marked "most secret" suggesting that WSC read out Auchinleck's "special communique" in the House of Commons at 12 noon on Tuesday 2 June and that Auchinleck publish it simultaneously in Cairo [Egypt]. 01 Jun 1942
CHAR 20/75/124 Telegram from the Minister of State in the Middle East [Richard Casey] to WSC marked "most secret" regarding the battle in Libya and stating that General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] is reporting daily, and that the enemy has underestimated Allied strength and that the balance of relative casualties will be appreciably on the Allied side. 31 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/125 Telegram from WSC to the Prime Minister of Australia [John Curtin] marked "secret" confirming that [the appointment of Stanley Bruce, High Commissioner for Australia in Britain, as accredited Australian representative to the British War Cabinet and the Pacific Council] is "entirely satisfactory". 31 May 1942
CHAR 20/75/126-127 Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, to WSC marked "secret" regarding his discussions with Vyacheslav Molotov [Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs]: thanks WSC for the gift of his books; confirms that he has sent invitations to Field Marshal Jan Smuts [Prime Minister of South Africa] and John Curtin [Prime Minister of Australia]; comments on the precarious nature of the Soviet position; comments on his anxiety to proceed with "Bolero" [codename for build-up of United States forces in Britain for invasion of Europe] and discusses landing ground forces on the far side of the Channel in 1942; comments on plans to increase shipping for Bolero by cutting materials for the Soviet Union; believes that Molotov should carry back "some real results" to Joseph Stalin. 01 Jun 1942
CHAR 20/75/128 Telegram from General Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief Middle East] to WSC marked "most secret" stating that he will send him his communique [on the battle in Libya] this afternoon and asking whether he should publish it at 12 noon local time or 12 noon GMT. 01 Jun 1942
CHAR 20/75/129 Telegram from WSC to the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, marked "personal and secret": states that he shares the President's anxieties over the Soviet Union and China in the next few months; states that Vice- Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten [Chief of Combined Operations and member of British Chiefs of Staff committee] will explain some of the practical difficulties of a medium- scale operation this year; states that he has had some very pleasant talks with General Henry Arnold [Chief of United States Army Air Force] but is still much troubled on the subject [of allocation of American combat aircraft]; comments on a mass air attack on Cologne [Germany]; comments on the battle in Libya. 01 Jun 1942